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ABSTRACT
Thispaper deals with the anatomy of devaluation in Latin America. In
an effort to understand the economics surrounding the causes and
consequences of exchange rate crises, eighteen devaluation episodes that
took place between 1962 and 1982 are investigated in detail. The paper
focuses on: (1) the relation between (inconsistent) macroeconomics policies
and exchange rate crises; (2) the role of real exchange rate overvaluation
in the precipitation of balance of payment crises under pre-determined
nominal exchange rates; (3) the role of exchange controls, multiple exchange
rates and black markets in the period preceding devaluations; and (4) the
effectiveness of nominal devaluations as a way to restore real exchange rate
equilibrium. A distinction is made between stepwise devaluations and
crawling peg regime. It was found that historically most stepwise
devaluations have had difficulty in sustaining a real devaluation over the
medium term. Countries that adopted a crawling peg have generally been able
to maintain a higher real exchange rate. In many cases, however, this has
been achieved at the cost of substantial inflation.
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This paper deals with the anatomy of devaluations in Latin America. In
an effort to understand the economics surrounding the causes and conse-
quences of exchange rate crises, eighteen devaluation episodes that took
place between 1962 and 1982 are investigated in detail. The paper focuses
on; (1) the relation between (inconsistent) macroeconomic policies and
exchange rate crises; (2) the role of real exchange rate overvaluation in
the precipitation of balance of payment crises under pre-determined nominal
exchange rates; (3) the role of exchange controls, multiple exchange rates
and black markets in the period preceding devaluations; and (4) the
effectiveness of nominal devaluations as a way to restore real exchange rate
equilibrium. Here a distinction is made between stepwise devaluations and
devaluations that are followed by a crawling peg regime.
The empirical approach followed in this paper consists on analyzing in
detail the evolution of a number of key variables during the three years
preceding and the three years following the 18 devaluation episodes. In
doing this, an effort is made to detect regularities across countries that
will allow us to infer some general rules relating to the causes and effects
of devaluations. At the same time care is taken to point out peculiarities
that help better understand the exchange rate history of a particular
country. A control group consisting of 24 developing nations that main-
tained a fixed nominal exchange rate for at least ten years was constructed
and its behavior compared to that of the devaluing countries. In these
comparisons non-parametric tests were used. Although this episodic strategy
for empirical inquiry departs significantly from the current practice of
using almost exclusively different regression techniques, it has modern
precedents in Cooper's (1971) well-known article on devaluation and, more2
recently, on Harberger and Edwards' (1982) study on balance of payments
crises) The episodic approach adopted in this paper has both advantages
and drawbacks. On the positive side it allows us to look at each individual
case, detecting peculiarities and regularities. It also permits us to deal
with issues that are very difficult to accurately quantify and, thus,
include in any type of regression analysis, such as the evolution of
exchange controls and quantitative restrictions. On the other hand, a well
known drawback of this empirical strategy, is that by focusing on "before"
and "after," it is not always easy to detect causality among variables. For
this reason, from time to time and in order to shed additional light into
the problem at hand, the episodic approach is supplemented with a regression
analysis.
The paper starts, in Section II, with a brief review of the analytical
aspects related to the balance of payments crises and to devaluation. This
analytical discussion sets the stage for the detailed empirical analysis of
Sections III and IV.
II. Macroeconomic Policy. Real Exchange Rates and Devaluations Under
Alternative Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes
A fundamental principle of open economy macroeconomics is that in order
to have a sustainable and stable macroeconomic equilibrium it is necessary
for monetary and fiscal policies to be consistent with the chosen nominal
exchange rate regime. This means that the selection of an exchange rate
system imposes certain limitations on the extent of macropolicies. If this
1Cooper (1971), however, didn't deal with the period preceding the
devaluations. Moreover, contrary to this study, and to Harberger and
Edwards (1982), Cooper didn't use a control group for comparison. Recently,
Edwards (1985c) and Kamin (1985) have also used the episodic approach, as
have some of the studies that have analyzed the effectiveness of IMF
programs.3
consistency is violated severe disequilibrium situations, which are usually
reflected on the real exchange rate misalignment, and in an eventual balance
of payments crises, will take place. In this section we briefly discuss the
interaction between macroeconomic policies, real exchange rate behavior,
exchange controls and balance of payment crisis. We also analyze the role
of devaluations in the adjustment process. In the discussion we make a
distinction between two alternative nominal exchange rate regimes: (1)
predetermined nominal exchange rates, including fixed rates and its variants
such as crawling peg and managed rates; and (2) nonunified exchange rate
systems, including dual rates and the case where a significant parallel
foreign exchange market coexists with the official rate.
11.1 Macroeconomic Policies and Real Exchange Rates Under
Predetermined Nominal Exchange Rates
Perhaps the case of a "high" fiscal deficit is the most clear example
of macro and exchange rate inconsistencies under fixed nominal rates. In
most developing countries fiscal imbalances are partially or wholly financed
by money creation. The inflation "required" to finance a fiscal deficit
equal to a fraction 6 of GDP is given by:
(1)
where itisthe rate of inflation required to finance the government
deficit, and A is the ratio of high-powered money to CDP.2 If, for
example, a country has a fiscal deficit of 8% of CDP and its stock of base
money represents 20% of GDP, the required rate of inflation will be 40% per
annum. If the required rate of inflation is as high as in this example,
2The increase in highpower money required to finance a deficit equal
to a fraction 8 of CD? can be written as:SM/P =6G.In equilibrium
LM/M is equal to the rate of inflation, and thus equation (1) follows.4
there will generally be an inconsistency between the fiscal deficit and the
maintenance of a fixed nominal exchange rate. Since the domestic price of
nontradables increases at a rate approximately equal to the rate of infla-
tion, and the domestic price of tradables grows at approximately the rate of
world inflation,3 a real appreciation will take place every period.
Under predetermined nominal exchange rates, all increases in domestic
credit that exceed the growth in the demand for domestic money will be
inconsistent with the maintenance of the fixed nominal rate. These excesses
of domestic credit creation above money demand growth will be translated
into an excess demand for tradable goods, nontradable goods, and financial
assets. While the excess demand of tradables will be reflected in a higher
trade deficit (or lower surplus), in a loss of international reserves, and
in an increase in (net) foreign borrowing above its long run sustainable
level, the excess demand for nontradables will be translated into higher
prices for those goods, and consequently into a real exchange rate apprecia-
tion. If there are no changes in the fundamental real determinants of the
equilibrium real exchange rate this real appreciation induced by the
expansive domestic credit policy will represent a departure of the actual
RER from its equilibrium value, or real exchange rate misalignment (i.e.,
overvaluation).
If the inconsistent macropolicies are not reversed, the drainage of
reserves and the real exchange rate appreciation will continue. Typically,
the authorities will try to stop this process by imposing exchange controls,
3The domestic price of tradables is equal toT EP* r, where
is the international price of tradables, E is the nomina' exchange rate
and r is one plus the tax on tradables. If the exchange rate is fixed and
there are no changes in r, will increase at approximately the rate of
world inflation.5
hiking tariffs and imposing quantitative controls. A number of times this
will result in the emergence of black markets on foreign exchange rate. In
section 11.2 below we discuss the functioning of this kind of system. These
policies, however, will only be able to delay the crisis. Eventually, the
country will "run out" of reserves and/or its real exchange rate will reach
a lower bound, at which point a devaluation, and possibly other corrective
policies will be implemented.4
The consistency between monetary and exchange rate policies is not only
needed under fixed rates, but also under most types of predetermined and
managed nominal exchange rates such as "active" crawling pegs, where the
economic authorities preannounce the rate of devaluation for a given period
into the future. Perhaps Argentina in the late l970s is the most notorious
recent case of an inconsistent fiscal and crawling nominal exchange rate
policies. During that period the Argentinian government implemented the by-
now famous preannounced rate of devaluation or "tablita" as a means to reduce
inflation. However, the preannounced rate of crawl was clearly inconsistent
with the inflation tax required to finance the fiscal deficit (Calvo 1986).
This inconsistency not only generated a real appreciation but also substan-
tial speculative activity, where the public basically bet on when the
"tablita" would be abandoned.
In a "passive" crawling peg regime, the monetary authorities adjust the
parity periodically, without following written or rigid rules. The extent of
exchange rate devaluation in each period responds to pragmatic considera-
tions, including inflation differentials, level of international reserves and
the behavior of the terms of trade. In a way, under this type of crawling
4There is a vast literatureon the theoretical determinants of exchange
rate crises. See, for example, Krugman (1979) and Calvo (1987).6
peg the need for "consistency" is somewhat reduced, since the rate of crawl
can always "accommodate" the monetary policy, in a way to avoid RER over-
valuation and reserves losses. If this is done, however, other macroeconomic
objectives, like reasonable price stability, would be seriously affected.
11.2 Macroeconomic Policies and the RER with Dual Nominal Rates and in
the Presence of Parallel Nominal Exchange Rate Markets
Nonunified (or multiple) nominal exchange rates have traditionally had
some appeal for the developing countries. Under this type of system
different international transactions are subject to differential nominal
exchange rates, giving rise to the possibility of having more than one real
exchange rate.5
Under this type of regime, the relation between macroeconomic policies
and the rest of the economy will depend on the nature of the multiple rates
system. If, for example, the multiple rates regime consists of two (or more)
predetermined (i.e., fixed) nominal rates, the system will work almost in the
same way as under unified predetermined nominal rates. This is because
multiple fixed nominal exchange rates are equivalent to a unified rate system
with taxes on certain external transactions.6 In this case, as with unified
predetermined rates, inconsistent macroeconomic policies will result in loss
of international reserves, a rate of domestic inflation that will exceed
world inflation, and in real exchange rate overvaluation. This situation, of
course, will be unsustainable in the long run and the authorities will have
to introduce corrective macropolicies.
5There is a growing theoretical literature on the effects of
macroeconomic policies under nonunified nominal rates. See Aizenman (1985),
Dornbusch (1986a,b).
6See,for example,the discussion in Dornbusch (1986a).7
A different kind of nonunified nominal exchange rates consists of a
fixed official rate for current account transactions and an (official)
freely fluctuating rate for capital account transactions. The main purpose
of this system is to delink the real side of the economy from the effects of
supposedly highly unstable capital movements. In this dual exchange rate
system, portfolio decisions are highly influenced by the differential
between the free and fixed rates or exchange rate premium. The private
sector decisions on what proportion of wealth to hold in the form of foreign
currency denominated assets is strongly affected by the expected rate of
devaluation of the free rate. The free rate, in turn, will be highly
responsive to expectations about future events.7
Under this type of dual exchange rate system, even if no current
account transactions slip into the free rate, changes in the free nominal
rate will still exercise an indirect effect on the relative price of
tradables or real exchange rate.8 Consider, for example, the case of a
sustained increase of domestic credit exceeding the increase in the demand
for domestic money. As before this will provoke an excess demand for goods
and financial assets. As a result of this policy there will be a decline in
the stock of international reserves, an increase in the price of nontradable
goods, and consequently a real appreciation. In addition there will be an
increase in the demand for foreign assets, which will result in a nominal
devaluation of the free rate, and in changes in the domestic interest rate.
In this case, if there are no capital controls and we assume risk
7.This type of regime has been recently discussed by Dornbusch (1986b).
8Notice that if no current account transactions are subject to the
free rate the relevant RER -- thatis the appropriate measure of
competitiveness --isthe fixed rate RER. This is because this is the one
at which all goods transactions can take place.8
neutrality, the following relation will hold between domestic interest rates
(i) and foreign interest rates (i*). =(e/f)i* +(f/f)where e is
the fixed nominal exchanger rate, f is the free rate and (i/f) is the
expected change in f. The devaluation of the freely fluctuating rate will,
in turn, have a secondary influence over the official real exchange rate via
a wealth effect (Dornbusch, 1986b). The bottom line, however, is that in
this case inconsistent macropolicies will eventually be also unsustainable,
as international reserves are drained. By isolating the current from the
capital account, all this type of dual rates system can hope to do is delay
the eventual crisis.
The analysis is somewhat more complex if in addition to the financial
side some current account transactions are subject to the free nominal
exchange rate. In this case we will have two real exchange rates -- in
addition to the traditional concept we will have a second RER defined as the
price of tradables subject to the free nominal rate relative to nontrad-
ables. In this case macropolicies will affect both realrates.9 For
example, an increase in domestic credit that exceeds growth of the demand
for domestic money will now result in lower reserves, higher prices on
nontradables, a higher "free" market nominal exchange rate, and increased
foreign indebtedness. The higher price of non-tradables will generate a
decline (i.e., appreciation) in the real exchange rate applicable to those
goods subject to the official foreign exchange market. What will happen to
the RER relevant to those goods subject to the free nominal rate? This will
depend on whether as a result of the higher rate of growth of domestic
credit the nominal exchange rate determined in the free market will increase
9Dornbusch (1986b) analyzes this case in some detail.9
by more or less than the price of non-tradable goods. If the same type of
behavior as under a freely floating rate is observed, we will likely
encounter a nominal exchange rate overshooting in this market, with the free
rate nominal exchange rate increasing -- atleast on impact -- bymore than
the price of domestic goods. The real exchange rate applicable to this type
of good will, at least in the short run, depreciate. It is perfectly
possible, then, that under this dual exchange rate system an expansionary
monetary policy results in a real appreciation for a subset of goods --
thosesubject to the official market --, anda real depreciation for a
different subset of goods -- thosesubject to the free market for the
nominal exchange rate.
Perhaps the most complex type of regime consists of an official pegged
(or predetermined) nominal exchange rate that coexists with an illegal or
quasi-illegal parallel market for foreign exchange. Although when there are
exchange controls some kind of black market for foreign exchange always
exist, there are times when this parallel market becomes very significant,
and even dominant.10 Although in some respects the combination of a fixed
official rate with a parallel market works in a way similar to the dual
rates regime discussed above, there are some important differences. First,
to the extent that the black market is illegal, the expectations and costs
of detection play an important role in determining the premium or difference
between the official and freely determined nominal exchange rates. Second,
expectations regarding political events are fundamentally important, since
they reflect possible future changes in the extent of exchange controls, and
10The extent and importance of the black market is basically determined
by whether authorities allow some changes in international reserves. Under
complete rationing the authorities have no reserves, and legal export
proceeds are the only source of foreign exchange.10
other important policies. Third, in this case exporters have to decide in
each period what proportion of their foreign exchange earnings to surrender
legally and what proportion to bring into the country via the parallel
market) This decision, of course, will partially depend on the level of
the premium itself)2
In the extreme case of a generalized parallel market with complete
rationing at the official rate, an increase in the rate of domestic credit
creation will result in higher domestic prices and in an increase in the
black market premium. Since the Central Bank has already lost all its
international reserves, the increase in domestic credit will not be
translated, as before, in losses of the official stock of foreign exchange.
This expansive monetary policy will result in an appreciation of the
official real exchange rate as well as in a decline of the relative price of
exports surrendered via the official market relative to those that use the
parallel market)3 As a result, a relatively smaller proportion of export
proceeds will be surrendered at the official rate, making the crisis even
worse. Eventually, the inconsistent macropolicies will become unsustain-
111n away exporters also face this decision under an official dual
system. In that case it will still pay to convert export proceedings at the
higher free rate.
12An important question in the case of generalized black markets
relates to determining what is the marginal exchange rate. Under these
circumstances the black market rate will generally be the marginal rate for
the import and import competing sectors. In the case of exports, the
marginal rate will depend on the institutional arrangement and on whether
exporters "have" to surrender a certain proportion or a certain foreign
exchange amount of their export proceeds, via the official market. If a
certain proportion of these proceeds has to be surrendered, the marginal
rate for exporters is a weighted average between the official and the black
market rate. If on the contrary exporters have to surrender a given number
of dollars, the black market rate is the marginal one.
13Depending on expectations the nominal exchange rate determined in the
parallel market can increase by more or by less than domestic prices.11
able, and corrective policies will have to be implemented. At this point
the issue of nominal exchange rate unification may become important, since
the authorities will try to devalue the nominal rate, and eliminate the
(legal or de facto) multiple rates system.
11.3. Nominal Devaluations and Adjustment
Unavoidably, the maintenance of inconsistent macro-policies will
eventually result in a devaluation and an attempt to generate a macroeco-
nomic adjustment. Nominal devaluations usually have a dual objective:
(a) they seek to generate a real devaluation or improvement in the degree
of international competitiveness of the country; and (b) via that RER
devaluation they seek to provoke an improvement in the external position
(i.e., level of international reserves, and/or current account) of the
country. Whether a devaluation will actually be successful will depend on a
number of factors, the most important being the initial conditions and the
l4,,.
accompanying macroeconomic poilcies. voviousiy, since i.
(where RER is the real exchange rate,E is the nominal exchange rate, P
is tlthe world price index and N is the domestic price index) a nominal
devaluation that increases E will only be effective in moving the RER
towards its higher equilibrium value if does not go up in the same
proportion as E.
In theory, and under the most common conditions, nominal devaluations
will affect an economy via three main channels)5 First, a devaluation will
14The initial conditions include whether thereare distortions stemming
from the existence of parallel markets for foreign exchange. See Appendix
VIII for a brief review of alternative theories of devaluation.
some cases, however, if there are extensive quantitative import
controls and parallel markets some of this effects will be different. See
the discussion below.12
have an exienditure reducing effect. To the extent that as a result of the
devaluation the domestic price level goes up, there will be a negative
wealth effect that will induce the real value of domestic currency denomina-
ted nominal assets, including domestic money. However, if there are assets
denominated in foreign currency, there may also be a positive wealth effect.
If the negative wealth effect dominates, there will be a reduction in
expenditure on all goods including tradables, and there will be a reduction
in the trade deficit. Second, a nominal devaluation will tend to have an
expenditure switching effect.16 If the nominal devaluation succeeds in
altering the relative price of tradables to nontradables, or real exchange
rate, there will be a substitution in expenditure away from tradables, and a
substitution in production towards tradables. The combination of these two
effects will result in an improved external situation for the country.
While the expenditure switching effect results in an increased demand for
nontradables, the expenditure reducing effect generates a decline in demand
for those goods. Depending on which of these effects dominate there will be
an increase or a decline for the demand for domestic home goods. Third, a
devaluation will result in an increase in the domestic currency price of
imported intermediate inputs. This will result in an upward shift of the
supply schedules for the final goods includingnontradables)7
An important characteristic of nominal devaluation is that, under
unified nominal exchange rates and with no quantitative restrictions, it is
not discriminatory, and increases the domestic (nominal) price of jJ.
16 .
Wesay it will "tend to have" because this assumes that the nominal
devaluation is translated into a real devaluation.
17The combination of these effects may very well result in a decline of
aggregate output as a consequence of the devaluation. See Edwards, 1986.13
tradable goods, services, and assets. This, however, will not be the case
if, as it usually happens in the developing countries, there is a parallel
(or dual) market, and the devaluation refers to the official rate only. In
this case, only those transactions affected by the official rate will be
directly affected by the change in the official exchange rate. Of course,
since the parallel (or free) market will be indirectly affected by the
official devaluation, transactions conducted in that market will be subject
to an indirect effect. Notice, however, that in general it is not possible
to know a priori whether an official rate devaluation will increase or
reduce the parallel market premium. Naturally, with parallel markets there
will be additional relative price changes, with the price of transactions
subject to the official rate changing relative to those subject to the
18
parallel rate.
When there are quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports, devaluations
will also fail to generate a uniform increase in the price of tradables. In
fact, in this case nominal devaluations may have quite a different effect
than in those circumstances where tariffs are used to restrict imports.19
In the case of QRs the domestic price of the importable will be endogenous,
in the sense that it will take whatever level is required for that market to
clear, in this case a nominal devaluation will tend to have no direct
(first round) effect on the domestic price of those importables subject to
180fcourse, the devaluation itself will affect the parallel rate.
Theoretically speaking an official devaluation can generate either an
increase or decline in the black market premium. The empirical evidence
indicates that following the nominal devaluation there is usually a drop in
the parallel market premium. An important question when there are parallel
markets refers to exchange rate unification. Lizondo (1986) has shown that
the equilibrium nominal rate can be either above or below the black market.
19See Krueger (1981).14
QR rationing. However, since the price of exportables continues to be
tied, via the exchange rate, to its world price, the devaluation will
increase their price relative to rationed importables. Nonrationed import-
ables will also be affected by the devaluation and their relative price
relative both to rationed importables and nontradables will tend to change.
Whether a nominal devaluation will be successful will depend on:(a)
accompanying policies implemented alongside with the devaluation, and (b)
on the initial conditions prevailing prior to the devaluation.
Let us first focus on the initial conditions. If the country imple-
ments a devaluation at a time when the real exchange rate is greatly
misaligned (i.e., overvalued) the nominal devaluation will generally be
helpful to restore equilibrium in the external sector. Under these initial
conditions, a nominal devaluation, if accompanied by the appropriate macro-
policies, will generally have a medium to long run positive effect on the
real exchange rate. In practice what the nominal devaluation will do is
help the country follow a smoother transition path toward reestablishing
equilibrium in the external sector (see Edwards 1987). If the initial
condition of real exchange rate misalignment has been generated by unsus-
tainable macroeconomic policies, a discrete once-and-for-all devaluation
will only have a lasting effect on the real rate if at the same time of the
devaluation the unsustainable policies are corrected. If, however, the
initial condition is one of equilibrium a nominal devaluation will have no
medium or long run effect.
The second set of factors that determine the effectiveness of a real
devaluation is the accompanying policies. In order for the nominal
devaluation to achieve a real depreciation it is critical that the nominal
devaiuatior is accompanied by expansive credit (or monetary) policies,15
expensive fiscal policies, and wage indexation policies.
It should be noted, however, that even if the accompanying macro-
policies are restrictive, nominal devaluations will never result in
eguiproportional real devaluations in the medium to longer run. The reason
is that there are a number of forces that work towards generating (at least)
a partial offsetting increase in the price level P. The most obvious of
these forces is related to the role of imported intermediate inputs. The
nominal devaluation will result in higher domestic prices of imported
inputs, and consequently of the cost of producing domestic goods. This
effect, that partially offsets the effect of the nominal devaluation will be
more important as time passes. That is, it will generally be expected that
the effect of the nominal devaluation on the real exchange rate will be
partially eroded through time. On impact of the nominal devaluation will
result in a high (and almost equiproportional) increase in the real exchange
rate. As time passes, the prices of imported goods, and in some cases wages
react to the nominal devaluation, the effect on the real exchange rate will
be partially eroded.
III. Balance of Payments Crises. Exchange Controls and Devaluations
in Latin America
In this and the following section we analyze in detail 18 episodes of
balance of payments and devaluation crises in Latin America between 1962 and
1982. This investigation focuses on three important issues: (a) the role
of "inconsistent" macroeconomic policies in the precipitation of the devalu-
ation crises;(b) the role of exchange controls before and after each of
these crises; and (c) the effectiveness of nominal devaluations as a means
to restore equilibrium and competitiveness (this is the subject of Section
IV). Table 1 contains data on the 18 devaluation episodes. All of theseTABLE 1
Devaluation Crises in Selected Latin American Countries
nfflvaluation(Percentazel
Year of One Year























































































B. Devaluations Followed by Crawling Peg
Bolivia 1982 684.000 155.102
Chile 1982 88.282 19.202
Colombia 1967 16.741 7.107
Ecuador 1982 32.600 63.198
Mexico 1976 59.600 13.965
Mexico 1982 267.837 49.181
Peru 1975 16.279 54.222
Source: Seetext.16
countries devalued their currencies in at least 15 percent after having
maintained a fixed (official) exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar
for two or more years. Eleven of them implemented a stepwise devaluation,
where after the exchange rate adjustment they attempted to once again fix
the nominal parity. Many of them did not succeed and experienced recurrent
devaluations. Seven of the countries adopted a crawling exchange rate after
devaluing.
111.1 Macroeconomic Policies and Balance of Payments Crises
As was pointed out in Section 11.1, under fixed nominal exchange rates
macroeconomic policies determine whether the exchange rate chosen by the
authorities can be sustained in the longer run. Under most circumstances,
if macroeconomic policies become "inconsistent", international reserves will
be eroded, the real exchange rate will experience an appreciation (i.e.,
overvaluation) and an exchange rate crises -- thatis a devaluation -- will
eventually occur. From an empirical point of view it is not trivial to
determine whether, for a particular country at a particular moment in time,
macroeconomic policies have indeed become inconsistent with the fixed peg.
In this section we tackle this issue by comparing the evolution of macro-
economic policy in the devaluing countries with that of the control group of
fixed rate countries.20
Table 2 summarizes the behavior of four indicators of domestic credit
and fiscal policies for the devaluing countries and for the control group:21
20This, of course, assumes that the policies followed by the fixers are
consistent and sustainable. This is not a very farfetched assumption.
211n order to avoid the influence of extreme outliers in theanalysis
we have summarized the data by means of the first, second (median) and third
quartile. Outliers can indeed distort the analysis if, for example,17
(1) rate of growth of domestic credit (Panel A); (2) rate of growth of
domestic credit to the public sector (Panel B); (3) percentage of credit
received by public sector as proportion of total domestic credit (Panel C);
and (4) fiscal deficit as proportion of CDP (Panel D). All the indicators
have been constructed using data from various issues of the International
Financial Statistics as well as several j types. For the devaluing
countries these indicators are reported for 3 years, 2 years, 1 year prior
to the devaluation as well as for the year of the devaluation. While Panel
A deals with monetary (or domestic credit) policy, the rest of the panels
take us beyond the monetary realm and into the fiscal side of the economy.
These panels provide three different ways of looking at fiscal pressures.
A number of revealing facts emerge from this table. First, macro-
economic policies became increasingly expansive in the devaluing countries
as the year of the devaluation drew nearer. Indeed, there is a clear shift
to the right of all four distributions in the three years prior to the
crisis. Second, the devaluing countries as a group behaved quite
differently than the control group. This is particularly clear for the
fiscal policy indicators. For example, the year prior to the crisis half of
the devaluing countries allocated one quarter or more of total domestic
credit to the public sector; the median for the control group countries, on
the other hand, was only slightly more than 10 percent. Formal texts
indicate that with a fairly high degree of probability, these policy
indicators for the devaluing nations come from a different population than
for the control group. The value of these x2 was 2.79 for the rate of
growth of domestic credit, 2.90 for the rate of growth of domestic credit to
averages are used. In our case, the Bolivian devaluation of 1982 is a major
outlier.TABLE 2
Indicators of Macroeconomic Policy in Latin American Devaluing
Countries: During the Year of Devaluation and Three Years
Preceding the Devaluation
3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
Prior to Prior to Prior to Year of Control
Devaluation Devaluation Devaluation Devaluation Group
A. Annual Rate of Growth of Domestic Credit (Percentage)
First Quartile 5.7 16.6 15.6 19.1 14.4
Median 25.5 28.2 22.2 27.5 17.4
Third Quartile 35.4 36.5 30.3 45.3 29.9
B. Annual Rate of Growth of Domestic Credit to Public Sector (Percentaze)
First Quartile 3.8 12.1 7.7 23.7 <0
Median 33.2 32.1 29.3 45.7 22.7
Third Quartile 58.4 62.6 53.2 113.9 33.2
C. Ratio of Domestic Credit to Public Sector to Total Domestic Credit
First Quartile 0.039 0.049 0.047 0.077 <0
Median 0.235 0.204 0.232 0.255 0.114
Third Quartile 0.327 0.345 0.343 0.456 0.279
D. Fiscal Deficit as Percentage of GDPa
First Quartile 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.7
Median 1.2 1.1 3.3 4.1 1.6
Third Quartile 3.6 4.6 4.6 6.6 2.7
a01 11 countries had data.
Source: See text.18
the public sector, and 6.49 for the fraction of total credit that goes to
the public sector. Although, due to the low number of observations, these
x2testsshould be considered with some degree of skepticism, they do
suggest quite clearly that as the crisis date approached the devaluing
countries macropolicies tended to become more and more inconsistent with the
goal of maintaining a fixed exchange rate.
Even though when taken as a group the devaluing countries behaved in a
distinctively different way than the control group, the policies of some
individual devaluing countries -- inparticular Venezuela in 1964 -- were
somewhat similar to those of the control group. Regarding the rate of
growth of domestic credit, in Ecuador in 1961, and Peru in 1967 tneir
behavior was not too different than that of the control group.
Expansive macroeconomic policies will generally have an impact on the
level of reserves and on inflation, and thus on the real exchange rate.
Table 3 contains data on the evolution of:(1) the index of the
(bilateral) real exchange rate;(2) ratio of net foreign assets of the
monetary system to money; and (3) the current account ratio during the
three years preceding the crisis. The main differences between Tables 2 and
3 is that in the former we have summarized the behavior of four key
exogenous policy variables while Table 3 deals with endogenous variables
whose behavior responds to the policy and other shocks.
The data in Table 3 very vividly capture the deterioration of the
external sector of these countries. In 14 out of the 16 countries with
relevant data the real exchange rate experienced a real appreciation in the
three years prior to the devaluation. Excluding the 1967 Colombian
devaluation, the average real appreciation during the 3 years preceding the
devaluation crisis was almost 9 percent. Naturally, this real appreciationTABLE 3
Evolution of Real Exchange Rate, Net Foreign Assets,
And Current Account Prior to Devaluation
Ratio of Netb (Current
Index of RERa Foreign Assets Account/GDP)c
Country Year -3 Yrs. -l Yr. -3 Yrs. -l Yr. -3 Yrs. -l Yr.
Argentina 1970 103.1 100 7.3 6.3 0.6 -1.0
Bolivia 1972 98.3 100 12.0 8.7 -5.6 -4.8
Bolivia 1979 103.0 100 26.0 2.9 -3.9 -10.0
Colombia 1962 108.9 100 1.2 -1.8 1.6 -3.0
Colombia 1965 155.7 100 -10.7 -11.7 -2.3 -3.0
Costa Rica 1974 101.6 100 12.8 16.7 -11.9 -9.2
Ecuador 1961 n.a.n.a. 18.9 16.4 -0.9 -2.5
Ecuador 1970 104.3 100 19.1 11.2 -5.8 -7.9
Nicaragua 1979 102.0 100 16.8 -36.0 -2.8 -1.0
Peru 1967 119.5 100 23.9 18.0 0.3 -3.7
Venezuela 1964 100.6 100 28.4 34.0 6.8 9.1
Bolivia 1982 129.9 100 -10.5 -23.3 -10.2 -10.4
Chile 1982 129.8 100 24.2 16.4 -6.2 -15.5
Colombia 1967 787e100 -11.9 -8.8 -3.0 -4.7
Ecuador 1982 105.7 100 26.6 -17.1 -3.9 -4.5
Mexico 1976 109.2 100 14.4 9.5 -2.5 -4.4
Mexico 1982 112.9 100 7.5 6.9 -3.8 -5.2
Peru 1975 95.4 100 18.1 18.9 -0.1 -6.2
Average Change Between -8.7% -40.8% -1.9
3 and lfYear Prior to (-2.98) (-2.27) (-2.41)
Crisis:
a. is a bilateral index relative to the U.S. constructed as
(E.WPI)/CPI. The index has been set equal to 100 the year prior to the
devaluation.
bRatio of net foreign assets to the sumofnet foreign assets plus domestic
credit. (Lines 3lN over the sumoflines 31N and 32 of the IFS.)
CR. of current account to GDP x 100.
dThis is the index two years prior to devaluation.
eColombia devalued in 1965. This explains the evolution of RER.
Exc1udes Colombia 1967. The number in parentheses are t-statistics for
null hypothesis that mean equals zero.19
was the result of domestic rates of inflation that increasingly exceeded the
world rate of inflation. A x2 test, in fact, indicates that as the crisis
date became closer the rate of CPI inflation in the devaluing countries
became more distinct, in a statistical sense, from that of the fixed rate
control group. While the 2(2) was 4.1 three years prior to the crisis
(level of probability 0.13), it was 13.7 one year before the crisis,
reflecting a probability of less than 0.001 percent of the null hypothesis
being accepted. It is interesting to notice that while, on average, these
countries experienced almost a 9% real appreciation in the two years prior
to the crisis, there is quite a difference in the individual countries'
experiences. While some of them, such as Colombia in 1965, went through a
major deterioration in competitiveness, others (i.e., Venezuela 1964) only
experienced an insignificant change in the real exchange rate index. This
recorded average real appreciation of 9% is, in many ways, an under-
estimation of the magnitude of the disequilibrium. In many cases, in the
period leading to the crisis price controls became quite pervasive,
rendering official CPIs somewhat inadequate to construct RER indexes.
The evolution of net foreign assets and of the current account balance,
also presented in Table 3, clearly captures the effect of the inconsistent
macropolicies on the external accounts. In 14 out of the 18 countries the
ratio of net foreign assets to money, experienced a decline during this two
year period, confirming the view that devaluation crises are usually
preceded byan important rundown of international reserves. On average, for
these 18 countries, the net foreign assets ratio declined in more than 40%
during the two years prior to the devaluation. The year before the crisis
the median of this indicator was 0.091, significantly below the median for
the control group 0.201. Also, in 14 of the 18 countries the current20
account ratio experienced a decline in the two years before the crisis, with
the average deterioration amounting to almost 2 percentage points of GDP.
The year prior to the crisis the median of current account deficit was 4.5%
of GDP about a full percentage point higher than the -3.6% for the control
group.
In addition to the deterioration of the current account, capital flight
is a crucial force underlying the weakening position of these countries'
external sector. Data not reported here clearly show that in spite of
existing, and increasing, control on capital mobility, as the devaluation
drew nearer and as a result of the heightened expectations of devaluation,
substantially larger amounts of funds flew these countries.
The data in Table 3 clearly highlights the fact that although one can
identify a dominating pattern among these devaluations, there are nontrivial
differences across countries. In the majority of them the devaluation
clearly responded to the simultaneous depletion of international reserves
and loss in competitiveness (i.e., real exchange appreciation). In others,
however, it is not possible to detect any of these symptoms in the years
prior to the crisis. In these cases the authorities anticipated that there
was a likely crisis down the road, and decided to tackle the problem before
things got out of hand. In the case of the 1964 Venezuelan devaluation, the
exchange rate adjustment amounted to an important corrective measure, with
the devaluation really being an elimination of the lowest of three official
exchange rates.
The lack of data on external terms of trade didn't allow us to analyze
for every country whether devaluations responded, at least partially, to an
exogenous deterioration of the external sector. However, it is clear that
at least in the Colombian devaluations of 1965 and 1967 the drastic21
deterioration in the country's terms of trade, stemming from drops in the
price of coffee in the preceding or devaluation years had much to dowith
the decision to devalue.
Quite clearly, simple mechanical rules that relate the decision to
alter the exchange rate to some unique indicator such as international
reserves, cannot explain the authorities' decisions to devalue.
Devaluations are a complex phenomenon, that responds to a combination of
factors, including, in some cases, the perceptions of future events,and the
authorities' desire to avoid the most painful aspects of balance of payments
crises.
111.2 Exchange Controls. Trade Restrictions, Parallel Markets and
Balance of Payments Crjs_j
In Table 4 we present a summary for those countries that have data of
the evolution of exchange controls and trade restrictions during the two
years preceding the crisis. Table 5, on the other hand, presentsdata on
multiple (official) exchange rates and on parallel (black) market premia in
the period immediately preceding the crisis,
The data presented in Table 4 on exchange controls have been classified
according to the IMF practice, distinguishesbetween:22 (a) payments
restrictions on current transactions, such as licenses, prior approvals,
multiple rates, prohibitions and so on;(b) tariffs, duties and price
related measures; and (c) restrictions on capital movements in the form of
either licenses or taxes. In this table we have tried to convey information
on the conditions prevailing two years prior to the devaluation and on any
changes implemented in the degree of controls in the year immediately prior
22See IMF's Yearbook of ExchangControls Payments Restrictions. The
information summarized in Table 2 was obtained from various issues of this
Yearbook.TABLE 4
Evolution of Exchange Controls and Trade Restrictions
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to the abandonment of the fixed peg. The table reveals that in the great
majority of the cases the devaluation was preceded by an important piling up
of exchange controls and restrictions. In some episodes, such as Colombia
in 1962 and 1967, Ecuador 1961, and Peru in 1975, the initial conditions
(two years prior to the crisis) were already extremely restrictive, and
become even tighter as the erosion of reserves became severe and/or real
exchange rate appreciation became more massive. In other cases, however, --
Venezuela1964 and Chile 1982 for example, -- theperiod preceding the
devaluation was characterized by a fairly free environment, with little
restrictions and no attempts by the authorities to impose any additional
controls
23
Table 5 shows that in the majority of these episodes the period
preceding the devaluation was characterized by the existence of multiple
exchange rates. In fact, only 6 out of the 18 cases had a unified official
exchange rate one year prior to the crisis, Interestingly enough, however,
in most instances the multiple rates were in place at least three years
before the crisis, and in most countries there was no increase in the number
of official rates as the devaluation date approached. Only in Nicaragua in
1979 and in Colombia in 1967 there was an increase in the number of rates
during the three years period preceding the crisis.
The data on parallel market premia in Table 5 are particularly
interesting.24 In 14 out of the 18 devaluation episodes there was a signi-
ficant increase in the black market premium during the 9 months preceding
is rather deceiving in the case of Venezuela, since a multiple
rate system was in effect.
24Depending on the country, these figures refer either to the black
market for foreign exchange or to the fluctuating rate in the "free segment".TABLE 5
Multiple Exchange Rates and Parallel Market Premium
In Period Prior to Devaluation
Source: Various issues
Yearbook.
of Picks Currency Yearbook and World Currency
Number of Official
Exchange Rates Black Market Premium(Percent)















Bolivia 1979 1 1 10.0 17.5 17.5
Colombia 1962 3 3 33.4 34.7 58.0
Colombia 1965 3 3 42.8 110.6 114.4
Costa Rica 1974 8 5 42.2 34.7 30.2
Ecuador 1961 2 2 21.9 23.3 66.7
Ecuador 1970 2 2 22.5 23.9 55.6
Nicaragua 1979 1 2 27.1 78.6 92.9
Peru 1967 1 1 2.2 2.2 43,6
Venezuela 1964 3 3 35.5 35.5 35.5
Bolivia 1982 2 2 25.0 502,3 434.1
Chile 1982 1 1 10.3 12.8 17.9
Colombia 1967 3 4 19.2 46.3 48.1
Ecuador 1982 3 3 25.0 45.0 74.4















the crisis. This evolution of the parallel market premium reflects three
interrelated forces. First, in the presence of a freely determined black
market rate, expansive domestic credit policies will usually be reflected in
a depreciation of the free rate, at the same time as the domestic rate of
inflation increases and international reserves eroded. Second, this hike in
the premium is capturing the public's reaction to the movement towards
greater exchange controls. And third, it also reflects the generalized
expectations that the situation is increasingly unsustainable and will
result in an eventual devaluation.
As the data on net foreign assets and on the current account in Table 3
clearly show, the imposition of these exchange controls and payments
restrictions did not succeed in putting an end to the erosion of foreign
exchange, nor did they succeed in halting the deteriorating situation in the
country's degree of international competitiveness. At most one can argue
t-hr 1,i al,r,r1 t-r, tr. cl r,t. 4et.m th
unavoidablecrisis, unleashed by the inconsistent macroeconomic policies.
An important side effect of these trade restrictions and exchange
controls is that they introduced serious distortions that impacted on the
economic performance of the economy. Data on the evolution of real growth
of GDP shows that already one year prior to the devaluation crisis countries
were performing significantly poorer than the control group; a x(2)8.7
indicated that the null hypothesis that the devaluing and the control groups
come from the same population is rejected.25 This finding has import conse-
quences for the "contractionary devaluation" controversy, since it suggests
25lnterestingly enough, three years prior to the crisis it is not
possible to reect the hypothesis that both groups come from the same
population (x (2) =0.555).24
that the observed decline in growth in periods surrounding devaluations may
in fact not respond to the crisis, but rather to the effects of the massive
imposition of restrictions.
IV. The "Effectiveness" of Nominal Devaluations in Latin America
It is difficult to assess empirically whether a nominal devaluation has
indeed been successful. There are various possible criteria one can use to
evaluate the "effectiveness" of a devaluation, including its effect on the
real exchange rate, its impact on the current account, on the level of
international reserves, or in any of the other accounts of the balance of
payments. Moreover, since devaluations are many times, if not always,
undertaken under quantity rationing their effects will tend to differ from
the more traditional textbook cases. An additional difficulty stems from
the fact that devaluations are almost always one of many components of
stabilization packages aimed at improving the external position of a
country. It is difficult to separate the effect of the devaluation itself
from that of the accompanying macroeconomic policies and from the trade
liberalization reforms many times implemented alongside the devaluation.
This difficulty is further complicated by the fact that large and abrupt
nominal devaluations are usually fairly isolated events that occur only
sporadically.26 In that regard devaluations are not easily subject to time
series regression analysis. In fact, in any developing nation one
encounters at most 5 large devaluations since World War II; certainly not
enough for meaningful regressionestimation.27'28
26By "abrupt" we don't necessarily mean unexpected.
27 is possible, however, to pool a number of episodes and estimate a
limited dependent variable model to analyze the determinants of devaluation.
See Edwards (forthcoming).25
Given these conceptual difficulties and the existing data limitations,
empirical analyses of devaluation have, by necessity, to be somewhat
descriptive in nature. The data should be approached in a humble way,
trying to extract as much information as possible from them, but being aware
that in some instances it is not possible to obtain very sharp conclusions.
In this section we follow the 18 devaluation episodes of Table 1, for three
years after the nominal exchange rate adjustments.
IV.l Nominal Devaluations arid Real Devaluations
The 18 devaluation episodes included in this study are different in a
number of respects (see Table 1 for the list of countries and for the
characteristics of the nominal exchange rate change). In some cases the
devaluation took place after more than a decade of fixed nominal exchange
rates (i.e., Mexico, 1976). In others, such as Colombia 1967, the devalua-
tion was implemented after only two years of attempting to maintain a fixed
parity. As can be seen in Table 1, in 11 of the episodes the devaluations
were a stepwise event, preceded and followed by a fixed nominal (official)
exchange rate. In the other 7 episodes the devaluation was preceded by a
fixed nominal exchange rate, but was followed by a crawling peg. All the
episodes, however, have three characteristics in common:29 (a) in all
cases the devaluation was preceded by two or more years of exchange rate
fixity; (b) the initial nominal exchange rate adjustment was at least 15%;
and (c) in all cases the initial conditions reflected (varying) degrees of
statement, of course, excludes those countries with an ongoing
crawling peg. Although under a crawling pet the nominal exchange rate is
effectively "devalued" every period, the economics involved are different
from those of straight large devaluations.
29These, in fact, were the requirements we used for an exchange rate
adjustment to qualify as a "devaluation episode", and, thus, for being
included in this study.26
disequilibrium.
Tables 6 and 7 deal with real exchange rates behavior during three
years after the devaluation. In Table 6 the index of the bilateral (with
respect to the U.S. dollar) real exchange rate one year before the devalua-
tion, the year of the devaluation, and one, two and three years after the
devaluation is presented. Table 7, on the other hand, presents data on the
ratio of the cumulative ex-post elasticity of the real exchange rate with
respect to the nominal exchange rate for the year of the devaluation, one,
two and three years after the devaluation.30 This cumulative "effective-





where k refers to the year of the devaluation, 1, 2 and 3 years after the
devaluation.RRKis the percentagechange inthe real exchange rate
betweentheyear prior to the devaluation and k years after the devalua-
tion (k0,1,2,3). Ekisthe percentage change in the nominal exchange
rate during the same period. This elasticity, then, provides an index of
the degree of erosion experienced by the real exchange rate during the three
years after the devaluation. A value of one means that the nominal exchange
rate adjustment has been fully transferred into a one-to-one a ____
devaluation.A negative value of the index, on the other hand, indicates
that more than 100% of the nominal devaluation has been eroded and that, at
that particular point, the real exchange rate is below its value one year
before the crisis.
30Both of these indexes were constructed using data on official nominal
rates. See below for indexes constructed with parallel markets dated.TABLE 6
Evolution of RER Index After Devaluation




























































































































Nominal and Real Devaluations in Latin American Ex-Post
RER Elasticity of Official Nominal Devaluation
Refers to ratio of 2 years prior to 2 years after.




to 3 Yrs. Prior Country
Argentina 1970 0.57 < 0 < 0 0.39
Bolivia 1972 0.12 0.52 < 0 0.92
Bolivia 1979 < 0 < 0 < 0 0.83
Colombia 1962 0.92 < 0 n.a. 0.78*
Colombia 1965 0.96 0.54 < 0 n.a.
Costa Rica 1974 0.61 0.35 0.44 1.11
Ecuador 1961 0.75 0.60 .008 1.00
Ecuador 1970 0.95 0,79 .68 1.21
Nicaragua 1979 0.20 < 0 < 0 0.65
Peru 1967 0.73 0.42 .22 0.91
Venezuela 1964 0.92 0.94 .99 1.37
Bolivia 1982 0.02 0.02 n.a.
Chile 1982 0.85 0.53 0.34 1.74
Colombia 1967 0.51 0.49 0.40 1.48
Ecuador 1982 0.50 0.25 0.14 1.32
Mexico 1976 0.73 0.42 0.22 1.08
Mexico 1982 0.51 0.17 0.06 1.61
Peru 1975 0.20 0.31 0.21 1.9427
The actual value of this ex-post elasticity index, then, measures in a
very broad sense what percentage of the devaluation has been effective. The
reasons why this is only a broad and somewhat inaccurate measure of "effect-
iveness't are:(1)it is based on a "before" and "after" analysis, without
maintaining other relevant variables constant, and (2) it doesn't take
into account the inflation consequences of the devaluations. As is argued
below this becomes important when evaluating the effectiveness of the
crawling peg devaluations. In subsection IV.4 below, however, we make an
explicit effort to control for other variables such as domestic credit
policy,fiscal policy and foreign shocks. The last column in Table 7
includes the ratio of the real exchange rate index three years after the
devaluation to three years prior to the devaluation.
These tables are very revealing, and provide a useful start for our
analysis. Let's first focus on the 11 cases of stepwise devaluation. These
i_.__1____ ..1__.___1__ e,___ — .i ii 2__ lfl'tL__.i_.... tLLSELUWLI1L LIIUI1.Ly LLV OL LLI ii episoues -- OSLaLS.ILd£YI'4,£.CUaUUL
1961and 1970, Peru 1967 and Venezuela 1964 -- threeyears after the
devaluation the real exchange rate index was higher than its value just
before the crisis. In only three episodes, however, after three years the
RER was above its value three years before the devaluation. These data also
show that in some cases the erosion was very rapid. For example, in the
cases of Argentina, Bolivia 1972 and 1979; Colombia 1962 and Nicaragua 1979,
it took less than a year for the effect of the nominal devaluation to be
completely wiped out. Table 7 shows that only in Costa Rica 1974, Ecuador
1970 and Venezuela 1964, the index of effectiveness equal or greater to 1/3
after 3 years.
The data on the crawling peg countries present a very different
picture. In the six cases for which there are data, three years after the28
devaluation the RER index was significantly higher than the year before.
Naturally, this was achieved by "fighting off" the real exchange rate
erosion with additional devaluations in the following years. Typically,
under this type of regime the authorities further devalue the currency in
magnitudes approximately equal to the domestic rate of inflation. Of
course, a potential problem with this policy is that it can lead to an
explosive (nonconvergent) process, where the devaluation generates
inflation, which partially erodes the effect of the devaluation; this leads
to a higher devaluation and even higher inflation and so on, ad-infinitum.
An alternative scenario, is one where the process is stabilized at some mild
rate of inflation, as in Chile in the recent period and in Colombia since
1967. Table 8 presents data on the evolution of inflation in our 18
episodes. As can be seen, of the crawling peg countries, only in Chile and
Colombia (1967) the rate of inflation 3 years after the crisis was below its
level 3 years before the devaluation. Also, these data indicate that among
the crawlers in Bolivia, Peru and Mexico (1982) the higher real exchange
rate was sustained at the cost of substantial permanent increase in the rate
of inflation.
The real exchange rate data in Table 6 were constructed using indexes
on official nominal rates. However, as noted above, in these countries
black markets of varying degrees of importance have traditionally existed.
In Table 9 we present, for those countries that have data, indexes of real
exchange rate constructed with data on parallel market nominal exchange
rates. Table 10 contains additional information on parallel markets and on
multiple exchange rate practices during the period following the devalua-
tions. As can be seen, in most cases the parallel market premium declined
rapidly during the months immediately following the crisis (i.e., 3 monthsSource: IFS.
TABLE 8
Inflation Rates in Latin American Devaluing Countries
Before and After The Crisis (Percent)
3 Years 1 Year 1 Year 3 Years
Country YearBefore Dev. Before Dev. After Dev. After Dev.
Argentina 1970 29.4 7.7 34.8 61.2
Bolivia 1972 2.2 3.7 31.5 7.9
Bolivia 1979 4.5 10.4 47.2 133.3
Colombia 1962 7.2 8.7 32.0 3.5
Colombia 1965 2.5 17.7 19.9 5.8
Costa Rica 1974 3.0 15.2 3.5 4.2
Ecuador 1961 1.3 1.7 2.9 4.0
Ecuador 1970 3.8 6.3 8.7 13.0
Nicaragua 1979 2.8 4.6 35.3 24.8
Peru 1967 9.9 9.0 19.0 5.0
Venezuela 1964 -2.4 1.2 1.7 0.0
Bolivia 1982 19.7 28.6 269.1 -
Chile 1982 33.4 19.7 27.3 30.7
Colombia 1967 17.7 19.9 5.8 6.8
Ecuador 1982 10.3 16.4 48.4 27.9
Mexico 1976 12.0 15.2 29.0 18.2
Mexico 1982 18.2 27.9 101.8 57.8
Peru 1975 7.2 16.9 33.5 57.829
after the crisis). In a number of episodes, however, this decline was
short-lived, and after 9 months the premium had once again increased. This
evolution of the premia provides some (limited) information on the way dual
markets, with a legal and an illegal segment, react to devaluations of the
official rate. In most instances, a large nominal devaluation of the
official rate will, on impact, tend to reduce the gap between the freely
determined parallel rate and the predetermined (i.e., fixed) official rate.
As time passes, however, and other forces are unleashed, the freely
determined black market rate starts responding to these forces and to
expectations. The nine months premium data in Table 10 confirm the general
ambiguities of the theoretical analyses on the subject.
Table 10 shows that only a handful of these official devaluations were
coupled with an exchange rate unification at a single higher official rate
-- Bolivia1972, Ecuador 1970, Bolivia 1982; in the case of Ecuador, how-
ever, this unification was very short-lived. In a few other episodes the
number of multiple rates was reduced -- CostaRica 1974, Venezuela 1964,
Colombia 1967 -- butmultiple rate practices were not eliminated. Interest-
ingly enough, and contrary to popular belief, instead of leading to unifica-
tion, many of these devaluations were actually followed by a more
generalized use of multiple rates, either the year of the devaluation or in
the subsequent two years.
IV.2 Devaluations. Exchange Controls and Payment Restrictions
As shown in the preceding section, the vast majority of our devaluation
episodes were preceded by a massive piling-up of exchange controls and trade
restrictions. As these efforts to slow down, or halt, the erosion of
international reserves failed, the economic authorities were eventually
"forced" to devalue and implement some sort of a stabilization program. AsTABLE 9
Parallel Markets Real Exchange Rate Indexes In
Devaluing Latin American Countries
3 Years 1 Year 1 Year2 Years 3 Years
Before Before Year After After After
Country Year Dev. Dev. Of Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
Bolivia 1972 79.3 100.0 108.2 86.3 69.6 66.3
Bolivia 1979 103.0 100.0 103.2 100.3 96.4 218.5
Colombia 1962 63.6 100.0 88.6 60.0 71.0 98.9
Colombia 1965 124.9 100.0 139.4 122.6 113.5 109.1
Ecuador 1961 88.2 100.0 99.8 115.6 92.5 91.4
Ecuador 1970 92.4 100.0 122.3 116.0 117.4 104.8
Peru 1967 122.8 100.0 125.9 130.2 130.0 171.8
Colombia 1967 81.6 100.0 92.6 89.0 90.2 108.8
Mexico 1976 113.8 100.0 172.6 135.4 128.9 124.9
Peru 1975 114.8 100.0 99.2 95.8 103.1 110.9
Source: Constructed from data obtained from various issues of Pick Currency
Yearbook.TABLE 10
Exchange Rate Unification and
Parallel Market Premium After Devaluation
Source: Various issues
Yearbook.
of Pick's Currency Yearbookand World Currency
Number of Official Rates
YearYr. of
Year PriorDev. +1 Yr.3 Yrs.
Black Market Premium
Month3 Mths. 9 Mths.
Prior Aftex After CountrY
Argentina 1970 1 1 5 5 0 0.5 9.0
Bolivia 1972 2 1 1 1 60.032.5 5.0
Bolivia 1979 1 2 2 1 17.515.0 20.0
Colombia 1962 3 3 3 4 57.811.0 14.4
Colombia 1965 3 4 4 2 114.435.9 19.3
Costa Rica 1974 5 3 3 3 30.2 3.5 15.2
Ecuador 1961 2 2 2 2 66.730.8 57.3
Ecuador 1970 2 1 2 3 55.6 16.0 9.2
Nicaragua 1979 2 5 3 6 92.997.0 47.8
Peru 1967 1 2 3 4 43.6 1.6 13.7
Venezuela 1964 3 2 2 2 35.2 0 0
Bolivia 1982 2 1 1 - 434.0180.0 300.0
Chile 1982 1 2 3 - 17.9 2.4 10.6
Colombia 1967 4 3 2 2 48.130.7 15.4
Ecuador 1982 3 4 4 - 74.476.4 118.7
Mexico 1976 1 1 ? - - -
Mexico 1982 1 2 2 - 40.9 23.5 33.3
Peru 1975 4 5 5 4 75.7 55.6 77.830
can be seen in Table 11, in a large number of cases this protective tendency
was reversed almost immediately after the devaluation. After devaluing, and
(somewhat) reestablishing the degree of international competitiveness of the
country, the authorities usually felt that the controls imposed in the few
years preceding the crisis were not needed any more. The combination of
these trade liberalization programs with the devaluations make the
evaluation of the impact of the latter on the trade account somewhat
difficult. First, this reduction in the degree of trade restrictions will
result in a change -- usuallyan increase -- ofthe equilibrium real
exchange rate, making the "required't real exchange rate devaluation higher
than with the controls. Second, given this policy mix -- devaluationwith
trade liberalization -- itis not surprising to find that in a large number
of countries real imports grew at very fast rates during the three years
following the crisis.
In a number of instances --Argentina1970, Colombia 1965, Costa Rica
1964 -- theliberalization of trade was short-lived, being reversed after
few months. Not too surprisingly, these are some of the countries for which
the effect of the devaluation on the real exchange rate eroded fairly
rapidly (recall Table 7). Moreover, in other cases --Peru1967, Nicaragua
1979 -- thedevaluation was accompanied by a sharp increase in trade and/or
capital movements restrictions. This reflects the fact that both of these
devaluations were in fact implemented under an environment where the
authorities saw the devaluations as partial remedies, without having a real
intention to implement demand management policies alongside them. Given
that the ultimate sources of the exchange rate and balance of payments
disequilibrium -- theinconsistent macroeconomic policies -- werenot
tackled there was little hope in lifting the controls.TABLE 11
Suimnary of Evolution of Exchange Controls and
Trade Restrictions After Devaluation
Payments Tariffs, Restrictions
Restrictions on Duties and Cost- on Capital
Country Year Current TransactionsRelated Measures Transactions
Argentina1970 .Decreasing restric- •Short run liber-.Increased
tions for one year. alization; abruptrestrictiveness.
Then highly increase in
restrictive, tariffs 6 mths.
after dev.
Bolivia 1972 •No significant •No change for 1 •No change.
changes. yr. Rapid in-
crease in tariffs
1 yr. after.
Bolivia 1979 •No significant •Mild liberaliza-•Slight liberal-
changes. tion. ization of
capital movement
ceilings.
Colombia 1962 .Decreasing. •Liberalization of •No change.
advanced deposits.
Colombia 1965 •Short-lived •Short-lived lib- •After 14 mths.
liberalization. eralization of restrictions
advanced deposits. greatly hiked.
Costa Rica 1974 •Very short run •Short run liber-eRestrictions on
liberalization. alization tariffscapital flows
were later raised. introduced.




Ecuador 1970 .Slight liberal- •Mild reduction in eMild liberal-
ization. tariffs; important ization of
liberalization ofcapital movement
advanced deposits. restrictions.














Peru 1967 'Increased restrict-
iveness.
'Tariffs raised. 'Sharp increase
in restrictions.
Venezuela1964 .Slight increase in
restrictiveness.
•No change. •No change.






















Source: Constructed from information obtained from various issues of the
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions and from various issues of Pick's Yearbook and World
Currencies Yearbook.31
IV.3. International Reserves, the Current Account, and Devaluation
Table 12 contains data on the evolution of gross real international
reserve (measured in TJS$ of constant value), the ratio of the current
account balance to GDP, and the ratio of foreign assets to money after the
devaluation. These indicators compare the levels of these variables one and
three years after the crisis with their levels one year before the devalua-
tion. While the data on reserves refers to percentage changes, those on the
current account ratio, and on the ratio of net foreign assets refers to
absolute changes.
This table provides a broad summary on how the external sector of these
economies evolved during the years following the abandonment of the peg. A
first revealing fact refers to the difference in behavior in the short run
(i.e., one year) and medium run (i.e., 3 years).31 While in a number of
countries there was a deterioration in most of these indicators of the in
the short run, the situation changed through time, and after three years
there had been a substantial improvement. In fact, it is quite striking
that after three years the real level of gross international reserves had
increased significantly in 15 out of the 18 countries. Naturally, this
"before" and "after" analysis does not allow us to establish rigorously
whether the accumulation in the level of reserves over this period of three
years responds to the devaluation or to other factors.
In some countries there was a simultaneous deterioration of the current
account and an improvement in the accumulation of gross reserves. This
apparently puzzling phenomenon is nothing but a reflection of the fact that
31Cooper (1971) focused on one year after the devaluations only.
However, the changing behavior through time detected in this table suggests
that by concentrating in the very short run some substantial part of the
action can be missed.apercentage
year prior
TABLE 12
Behavior of External Sector Variables 1 and 3 Years
After Devaluation









































-0.55 1.25 -0.0240.029 -0.03-0.05
0.07 1.28 0.029-0.028 -0.04 0.14
-0.51-0.36 -0.0100.014 -0.14-0.94
-0.52 0.14 -0.0470.026 -0.11-0.04
0.07 1.85 -0.025-0.005 0.03 0.06
-0.23 1.73 -0.0010.011 -0.13-0.00
0.16 0.95 -0.010-0.005 0.0000.04
-0.19 2.87 -0.0620.053 -0.06 0.21
-0.01 1.35 -0.205-0.156 -0.02 0.13
-0.01 1.96 -0.0120.064 -0.04 0.09
0.18 0.29 -0.064 -0.073 0.01 0.01
0.55 0.89 - - -0.13 -
-0.44-0.28 -0.0020.021 -0.06 -
-0.01 2.27 -0.0050.124 0.03 0.04
-0.01 0.09 0.001 - -0.09 -
-0.17 0.12 0.003 0.006 -0.03 -0.02
-0.80 0.15 0.079 - 0.02 0.000
-0.58-0.68 -0.0730.053 -0.02-0.77



















change in non-gold real reserves (in U.S. $)withrespect to
to crisis.
to GDP with respect to 1 year before32
capital inflow, and or reversed capital flows, have played an important role
in most stabilization programs. In a number of these episodes the devalua-
tion was, in fact, part of an IMF-supported adjustment program which allowed
the country in question to obtain substantial short and medium term re-
sources; both from the international private banks and from the IMF, itself.
A limitation of using the real level of gross international reserves as
an indicator of the external sector's behavior is that there is a strong and
generalized tendency for the level of reserves holdings to increase through
time, as countries grow and expand their level of foreign trade. In fact at
times recorded growth of reserves can be quite misleading since they have
been acquired via higher indebtedness and only to satisfy the growing demand
of the Central Bank for international 1iquidity.
This problem can be solved by concentrating on some relative measure of
international liquidity, such as the ratio of foreign assets to money
reported in Table 12. An alternative indicator that is sometimes useful is
the number of months worth of imports that the Central Bank holds in the
form of reserves. Looking at Table 12 we can see that the ratio of net
foreign assets provides a somewhat different story than the level of
reserves, indicating that in a nontrivial number of countries the external
situation in fact deteriorated after the devaluation, over and above the
already precarious initial conditions of one year before the crisis.
Interestingly enough, and not too surprising, many of those countries whose
external position measured by the ratio of foreign assets, experienced a
deterioration, are among those for which the effect of the devaluations on
the determinants of the demand for reserves by the developing
countries see Edwards (1983). On the relation between foreign borrowing and
the demand for the international reserves see Eaton and Gersoritz (1980).33
the RER eroded fully before three years -- Argentina1970, Bolivia 1972,
Colombia 1962, Bolivia 1979.
The Peruvian episode of 1975 provides a fascinating contrast. As was
reported in Table 7, in this episode the authorities were able to maintain,
via successive devaluations, a substantially high real exchange rate during
the three years following the crisis. However, as Table 12 shows, this was
of no avail, and that the external sector continued to deteriorate, to the
point that in 1979 the Peruvian government was forced to reschedule its
massive foreign debt. This was largely the result of generalized expecta-
tions that the policies undertaken by the authorities were not consistent
with a return to stability.
IV.4. Macroeconomic Policies
Theoretically, whether nominal devaluations succeed or not in helping a
country regain international competitiveness will largely depend on the
accompanying macroeconomic policies. If the economic aithorities don't put
a check on the ultimate cause of the crisis that triggered the devaluation
--thatis, the inconsistent macroeconomic policies --theeffects of the
exchange rate adjustment will indeed be very short-lived.
Table 13 contains data on three of the indicators of domestic credit
and fiscal policies considered in Section III (Table 2):(a) rate of
growth of domestic credit; (b) rate of growth of domestic credit to the
public sector; and (c) proportion of total domestic credit received by the
public sector. It is very educational to compare the evolution of these
data with the behavior of these indicators for the control group of 24 fixed
exchange rate countries. In fact, if we consider the control group policies
as a broad characterization of those policies "consistent" with maintaining
a fixed rate, this comparison can shed additional light on successful andTABLE 13
Macroeconomic Policies in Period Following Devaluation
Rate of Growth of Fraction
Rate of Growth Domestic Credit Of Total Credit
Domestic Credit To Public Sector To Public Sector
Country Year +1 Yr. +3 Yrs.+1 Yr. +3 Yrs. +1 Yr. +3 Yrs.
Argentina1970 41.9 94.7 14.3* 133.3 2.1* 4.8*
Bolivia 1972 31.2 38.5 4.1* 186.0 45.8 23.3
Bolivia 1979 38.1 343.2 62.3 411.8 44.8 53.1
Colombia 1962 16.7* 23.0 12.3* 45.7 24.1 31.3
Colombia 1965 17.9 16.4* <0* <0* 24.9 21.5
Costa Rica 1974 45.2 31.0 161.5 126.5 14.1 21.4
Ecuador 1961 1.9* 10.8* 2.2* <0* 10.9* 4.8*
Ecuador 1970 13.0* 7.8* 18.7* < 0* 27.8 16.0
Nicaragua1979 n.a. 31.5 n.a. 54.9 3.43 34.7
Peru 1967 12.0* 13.2* 18.5* <0* 36.3 25.0
Venezuela1964 10.7* 8.9* < 0* <0* < 0* <0*
Bolivia 1982 171.3 5126.3 217.2 - 62.0
Chile 1982 10.9* - 36.7 - 94* -
Colombia 1967 16,4* 17.2* <0* <0* 21.5 14.2
Ecuador 1982 59.2 - - - -
Mexico 1976 142.1 34.9 94.7 33.0 50.5 46.2
Mexico 1982 49.4 67.9 47.4 87.1 57.4 55.1
Peru 1975 54.3 54.1 114.0 55.4 33.5 35.3
First Quartile 12.5 14.0 12.5 14.0 10.6 7.2
Median 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 26.4 27.0
ThirdQuartile 12.5 14.0 51.8 64,5 45.1 35.2-
*
Meansthat the value is less or equal to the median of the same variable
for the control group of fixers.
Source: See text.34
unsuccessful devaluations. In only 5 of the 18 devaluation episodes the
rate of growth of domestic credit was lower than the median for the control
group (17.4%) both one and three years after the devaluation --Ecuador
1961, Ecuador 1970, Peru 1967, Venezuela 1964, Colombia 1967. When the
other two indicators of macroeconomic policy are considered, the situation
is very similar. In only a handful of countries the demand management
policies immediately following the crisis can be considered to be tight.
In order to investigate in a more rigorous way the form in which
macroeconomic policies and devaluations interacted during these episodes,
and the way in which they affected the behavior of the real exchange rate, a
number of cross section regressions were estimated. These equations took
each devaluation episode as the observation unit, and considered the rate of
change of the real exchange rate as the dependent variable. The independent
variable included the nominal devaluation, the rate of growth of domestic
credit, the change in the rate of growth of domestic credit to the public
sector, and the change in the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GDP. The
equations estimated were the following:
RRk a1 + a2Ek + a2C + a3FISk + U
where RR.K is the percentage change in the real exchange rate between the
year prior to the devaluation and k years after the devaluation (for
k 1,2,3 years), for country (episode) n. is the percentage change
of the nominal exchange rate during the same period, for country n. Given
the nature of the data set used, in most step-wise devaluation cases
ft2= ft3 = ftinitialdevaluation. is the rate of growth of
domestic credit between year k and the year prior to the devaluation.
FISk is the change in the particular index of fiscal policy used. The35
results from this equation allow us to have an idea on the average effects
of the nominal devaluations on the RER maintaining (most) other things
constant. The results obtained from the estimation of this equation are
presented in Table 14. Given the very small numbers of observations, these
results should be interpreted cautiously; in spite of this the results are
quite revealing. In all but one case the coefficients had the expected
signs, confirming that expansive macroeconomic policies will generally
result in an erosion of the real exchange rate. Moreover, these results
clearly show that nominal devaluations coupled with rapid rates of growth of
domestic credit or of the fiscal deficit will be self-defeating.
Additionally, these results provide some idea on the "effectiveness" of
nominal devaluations with other things constant. To the extent that
governments are able to control their fiscal and monetary policies they will
be able to significantly enhance the short to medium run effects of nominal
devaluations on the real exchange rate.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated in some detail the anatomy of
devaluations in Latin American. The analysis proceeded from the causes and
close determinants of devaluations, to their consequences. Data on 18 major
devaluation episodes were followed for a seven year period that spanned from
3 years prior to the crisis up to three years after the crisis. The
methodology used was to a large extent descriptive, and made extensive use
of non-parametric tests in comparing the behavior of the devaluing countries
to that of a control group of 24 developing nations that maintained a fixed
exchange rate for at least 10 years.TABLE 14
Nominal Devaluations and Real Devaluations In Latin America:
Cross Section Regressions (OLS)
ek CSk DEF
Panel A: k —1year




0.212 -0.025 -0.022 0.717
(3.674) (-0.315) (-0.773)
Panel B: k —2Years






Panel C: k —3Years
0.091 -0.091 -0.009 0.214
(0.851) (-1.012) (-0.366)
0.122 -0.079 - 0.245
(1.781) (-1.537)
0.147 -0.064 -0.082 - 0.438
(2.394) (0.783) (-2.117)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.36
The empirical analysis forcefully indicates that historically the
immediate causes of devaluations have been a rapid depletion of the stock of
international reserves and a substantial real appreciation (i.e., over-
valuation) of the real exchange rate. The ultimate causes of the balance of
payments crises, however, were expansive domestic credit and fiscal policies
that became inconsistent with maintaining a fixed peg. The analysis also
shows that in the period leading to a devaluation countries have generally
piled up exchange controls and trade restrictions in an effort to stop the
imminent crisis. Black market premia goes up, but the drainage of reserves
is not stopped; at most it is somewhat slowed.
The impact of a devaluation will depend on a number of factors,
including the specific institutional environment and exchange rate system.
In particular, in the realistic case of quantity rationing, multiple rates
and parallel markets, devaluations will have different consequences than
what the textbook model suggests.
What makes a "successful" devaluation? This is not an easy question to
answer. Not only are there many ways to assess success, but devaluations
are only one component of larger macroeconomic packages. In spite of the
intrinsic difficulties related to evaluating this issue, the empirical
analysis in this paper provides a number of important clues and leads, In
particular, it is possible to classify our episodes into three broad groups
of: successful devaluations, unsuccessful devaluations, and those devalua-
tions for which it is not possible to provide a categorical verdict.
Looking at the definite cases of success and failure provides important
lessons.
Let's look at the record, on the effect of the devaluations on the
behavior of the RER. The data in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that in only 3 of37
the 11 stepwise devaluations we can talk of "success" -- Ecuador1970,
Venezuela 1964 and Costa Rica. On the other hand, one can easily detect six
(out of eleven) clear failures where after only one or two years the real
exchange rate was already way below its already overvalued level of one year
prior to the crisis.33
The picture is very different when one looks at the crawlers. In all
six cases for which there are data, after three years the real exchange rate
index was way above its predevaluation level. One should be careful,
however, to jump to the easy and naive conclusion that all crawling pegs are
successful! Indeed, in many ways the definition of a crawling peg is a
system geared at avoiding RER overvaluation. In order to assess the real
degree of success of the crawlers it is necessary to ask ourselves at what
cost the higher RER was maintained. From Table 8 it is clear that, in many
episodes, the main cost is related to a rapid increase in inflation. The
severe cost related to high (i.e., over 50% per annum) rates of inflation
are too well known to be repeated here. What is clear, however, is that it
is not possible to refer to a "successful devaluation" when a 30% real
devaluation is accomplished by provoking a 150% rate of inflation.
As in the case of step-wise devaluers, successful crawlers require to
implement consistent demand management policies along side the devaluation.
The scrutiny of the data presented in this paper allows us to indicate one
clear successful crawler: Colombia in 1967. The Chilean devaluation in
1982 comes in an honorable second place.
33Argentina, both Bolivian devaluations, Colombia 1962 and 1965, and
Nicaragua. The data in Table 13 is quite categorical. In successful
countries devaluations have been only one component of broader programs




Country IFS Country Code Year of Study
Cote d'Ivoire 662 1965-1977
Dominican Republic 243 1960-1980
Ecuador 248 1971-1980
Egypt 469 1960-1971
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